

















































































Batman	talk	to	SpongeBob?”	Even	young	children	are	likely	to	say	“no.”	But	to	“Can	Batman	talk	to	Robin?”	their	answer	is	much	more	likely	to	be	“yes.”			 Beliefs	with	in-the-story	operators	are	needed	to	explain	this	result.	Imaginings	alone	can’t.	Children,	I	take	it,	can	imagine	Batman	talking	to	SpongeBob.	Many	of	them	probably	do,	as	soon	as	they	hear	the	question,	so	what	they	do	or	don’t	imagine	doesn’t	explain	the	pattern	of	responses.	Rather,	their	“no”	answers	express	beliefs	about	story	worlds,	with	two	separate	operators	to	track	these	worlds:	<s-Batman>	and	<s-SpongeBob>.	Each	operator	is	linked	to	different	generating	representations	and	worlds	of	evaluation.	Beliefs	that	incorporate	these	operators	combine	with	genre	truths	and	knowledge	of	story	conventions	to	yield	further	beliefs,	such	as:	Ba	<s-Batman>	there	are	no	talking	sponges.			 3.	People	hypothesize	about	stories.	As	I	first	read	Brothers	Karamazov,	I	hypothesized	Ivan	was	the	killer	of	the	father	(was	I	right?).	Such	hypotheses	are	common:	Gatsby	will	be	with	Daisy	in	the	end;	Liz	will	marry	Darcy;	Harry	will	defeat	Voldemort;	Nick	killed	Amy.	We’re	surprised	if	our	hypotheses	are	disconfirmed,	and	we	say	(misleadingly)	“I	knew	it!”	if	they’re	confirmed.	Our	usual	verbal	expressions	of	such	hypotheses	don’t	make	the	in-the-story	operator	explicit.	We	rather	say,	“I	think	Ivan	was	the	killer.”	But	the	mental	states	so	expressed	do	have	an	<s-i>	constituent:	they	have	the	form	Ha	<s-i>p.	You	don’t	look	for	evidence	about	an	actual	guy	named	Gatsby	in	the	actual	world,	as	one	would	if	one’s	internal	hypothesis	had	no	such	operator;	rather,	you	look	at	the	sentences	that	constitute	the	text	of	the	story.	The	presence	of	the	operator	shifts	the	hypothesis’s	evidential	base	to	the	generating	representations	of	the	story,	as	discussed.		 This	point	becomes	clearer	through	contrasting	the	following	pair	of	examples.	Archeologist	Andie	hypothesizes	Troy	traded	with	Mycenae.	Literary	Critic	Larry	prima	
facie	hypothesizes	the	same	thing,	namely,	Troy	traded	with	Mycenae.	But	Andie	is	concerned	with	the	actual	city	that	Frank	Calvert	and	Heinrich	Schliemann	rediscovered	
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same	goes	for	play	acting	a	storyline:	I	might	imagine	multiple	ways	that	the	scene	might	go	and	then	pick	one	to	act	out.		 *	 *	 *		 What’s	striking	in	these	playful	phenomena	is	the	continuity	between	story	consumption	and	story	creation.	One	might	think	there	could	be	a	“pure”	consumer	of	fiction	who	attempts	to	have	only	beliefs	about	a	story,	without	having	unprescribed-yet-appropriate	imaginings	along	the	way.	Someone	who	reads	novels	just	to	win	at	Jeopardy	
might	be	such	a	person.	But	it	is	at	least	usual	for	people	to	do	more—to	have	imaginings	that	outstrip	what	they	believe	the	official	story	to	be,	like	my	imagining	of	Magwitch’s	face.	These	daydream-like	imaginings	take	on	a	life	of	their	own,	giving	rise	to	fan	fiction,	which	takes	as	its	starting	point	beliefs	about	the	original	story	and	develops	them	imaginatively	into	a	new	story	or	story	extension.	Original	story	creation,	finally,	is	just	like	the	last	step,	except	without	a	pre-existing	story	on	which	to	rely.	This	continuum	of	creative	states	and	processes	gives	us	an	explanatory	burden	that	can’t	be	met	by	Ba	<s-i>p	states	alone.	Positing	imagining	meets	that	burden.	It	is	a	cognitive	attitude	shared	across	the	spectrum	from	the	modestly	creative	story	consumer	to	the	prolific	story	creator.	And	this	is	why	story	consumption	has	a	playful	side:	from	a	psychological	standpoint,	the	use	of	imagination	in	story	consumption	is	continuous	with	story	creation.		Taken	altogether,	these	considerations	show	that	we	should	posit	Ba	<s-i>p	states	and	Ia	p	states	in	order	to	explain	psychological	phenomena	involved	in	processing	stories.	Ba	<s-i>p	explains	1-3	(or	more	serious	phenomena)	in	ways	that	Ia	p	doesn’t,	and	Ia	p	explains	4-7	(or	more	playful	side	phenomena)	in	ways	that	Ba	<s-i>p	doesn’t.	So	we	should	appeal	alternately	to	both.	And	these	differences	in	explanatory	roles	make	sense	in	light	of	the	Conceptual	Differences	identified	in	the	last	Section.	All	this	suffices	to	establish	the	Explanatory	Differences	thesis—and	to	dislodge	the	tempting	thought	in	favor	of	conflation	
		 25	
put	forth	by	Gendler.	We	also	see	a	certain	alignment	in	relation	to	our	shared-personal	puzzle:	the	serious	side	(the	“getting	it	right	side”)	is	a	cluster	of	behaviors	and	thought	patterns	that	enable	one	to	share	a	story	with	others	so	that	all	parties	are	on	the	same	page;	the	serious	side	phenomena,	in	a	deeper	sense,	are	all	aimed	at	enabling	us	to	share	the	same	story	with	one	another.	The	playful	side,	however,	which	is	not	constrained	by	getting	things	right,	is	a	cluster	of	ways	of	relating	to	a	story	that	are,	at	least	at	first,	personal	and	idiosyncratic	to	each	individual	(or	perhaps	small	group).		
Section	4:	Emotions	But	which	cognitive	states	generate	the	emotional	responses	we	have	to	fiction?	We	are	shocked	and	sad	when	Othello	goes	through	with	murdering	Desdemona;	we	are	anxious	when	we	find	out	that	Magwitch	is	Pip’s	mysterious	benefactor;	we	are	joyous	when	the	Eagles	come	to	save	Frodo	and	Sam;	etc.	We	have	to	have	cognized	the	relevant	story	events	in	some	way	in	order	to	have	such	emotional	responses.	Are	the	relevant	cognitions	Ba	<s-i>p	or	Ia	p	states—or	both?	Here,	most	importantly,	we	must	beware	of	sinking	into	a	false	dichotomy.	If	you	ask	the	literature	on	this	topic,	you’ll	find	that	the	most	common	response	is	that	imagining	is	“the”	cognitive	input	into	emotional	responses	to	fiction.	This	passage	from	Tyler	Doggett	and	Andy	Egan	(2012:	278)	seems	representative28:	“We	propose,	again,	the	origin	of	our	anxious	affect	had	a	cognitive	and	a	conative	component.	But	the	cognitive	component	wasn’t	a	belief—it	was	an	imagining,	a	cognitive	state	analogous	to	belief”	(their	italics).	Notice	the	false	dichotomy?	And	the	standard	view	on	the	origins	of	emotional	responses	to	fiction	does	little	to	correct	it.	On	the	standard	view,	as	I	understand	it,	imaginings	can	be	in	the	same	representational	formats	as	beliefs	(or	“codes,”	as	Nichols	(2006)	would	put	it),	so	they	can	trigger	emotional	systems	in	the	same	ways	that	beliefs																																																									28	See	Meskin	and	Weinberg	(2003),	Spaulding	(2015),	Nichols	(2004,	2006),	and	Currie	(2014)	for	similar	statements.	
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do,	albeit	in	attenuated	ways.	So	since	fictions	generate	imaginings,	they	trigger	emotions	that	are	similar	to	the	emotions	beliefs	with	the	same	contents	would	trigger.	This	view,	to	me,	seems	correct	as	a	partial	explanation	for	how	imagining	helps	generate	emotions,	and	I	have	even	defended	versions	of	it	myself.	But	that	standard	view	about	imagining	doesn’t	resolve	the	issue	of	whether	Ba	<s-i>p	enter	into	the	profile	of	cognitive	states	that	are	causally	responsible	for	emotional	responses	to	stories.	So	Doggett	and	Egan’s	“the”	in	“the	cognitive	component”	is	misleading,	since	there	might	be	more	than	one	kind	of	input,	and	I	think	they	are	also	wrong	to	imply	that	belief	isn’t	involved.	So	my	task	in	this	section	is	to	argue	that	both	Ba	<s-i>p	or	Ia	p	states	are	involved	(in	different	ways)	in	generating	emotional	responses	to	fiction.	What	follows	are	three	arguments	for	thinking	this	is	so,	all	of	which	are	inferences	to	the	best	explanation:	some	emotional	responses	to	fiction	are	best	explained	in	ways	that	refer	to	beliefs	people	come	to	form	about	the	stories;	other	responses	should	be	explained	in	ways	that	appeal	to	imagining;	and	many	emotional	responses	are	best	explained	in	ways	that	appeal	to	both	kinds	of	mental	state	working	together.		First,	let’s	consider	the	famous	example	of	Little	Nell,	who	was	at	death’s	door	in	Dickens’	serial	The	Old	Curiosity	Shop.	Readers	who	were	reading	the	installments	as	they	came	out	begged	Dickens	not	to	let	her	die,	and	then	wept	profusely	when	they	learned	she	did	die.	Can	imagining	alone	provide	the	cognitive	side	of	the	explanation	of	these	tears?	It	seems	not,	even	though	those	readers	no	doubt	imagined	many	things	about	Little	Nell.	Presumably,	the	people	who	wrote	to	Dickens	begging	him	not	to	let	her	die	had	already	
imagined	Little	Nell	dying	prior	to	reading	the	fatal	installment.	How	would	it	occur	to	them	to	write	Dickens	about	it	had	they	not	imagined	it?	And	perhaps	they	cried	a	little	when	they	imagined	Nell	dying	as	they	wrote	their	letters	to	Dickens,	but	that	imagining	was	not	what	triggered	their	profuse	tears.	The	profuse	tears	came	when	people	read	the	
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installment.	That	is,	the	tears	came	when	the	readers	finally	learned	and	hence	believed	that	in	The	Old	Curiosity	Shop	Little	Nell	was	dead.29		The	reason	for	this	is	that	belief,	properly	understood,	is	a	constraint	on	how	things	are	for	you	in	a	way	that	imagining	is	not.	And	many	emotional	responses,	even	to	fictions,	depend	on	(or	are	greatly	magnified	by)	that	cognitive	constraint:	for	many	types	of	emotional	reaction,	one	does	not	respond	as	powerfully	to	represented	contents	that	are	regarded	as	optional	or	uncertain.	This	is	obvious	for	beliefs	versus	imaginings	about	reality:	believing	one	won	the	lottery	engenders	far	stronger	emotions	than	merely	imagining	one	did.	The	interesting	point	here	is	that	something	similar	is	true	about	the	mental	representations	that	encode	story	lines:	for	many	(though	probably	not	all)	story	contents,	belief	that	the	content	is	true	in	the	story	(“Oh	no!	She	died!”)	engenders	a	stronger	emotion	than	merely	imagining	the	content	without	(yet)	believing	it.		At	the	very	least,	believing	certain	events	happen	in	a	story	adds	something	to	whatever	one	imagines,	and	this	addition	is	often	emotionally	efficacious.	Suppose	that	someone	had	a	paper	with	smudged	text	and	so,	despite	imagining	almost	all	the	same	things	as	the	other	readers,	wasn’t	sure	whether	or	not	Little	Nell	“really	died.”	That	reader	would	be	eager,	even	desperate,	to	learn	(hence	form	beliefs	about)	what	happened,	and	that	learning	would	make	a	difference	to	her	emotional	experience	in	relation	to	the	story.	In	sum—pace	Doggett	and	Egan—the	beliefs	one	has	about	what	happens	in	a	story	affect	emotional	responses.30		
																																																								29	Peter	Langland-Hassan	has	independently	put	forward	similar	arguments	on	the	scholarly	blog	about	imagination	called	The	Junkyard.	See	his	“Choosing	Your	Own	Adventure?”:	https://junkyardofthemind.com/blog/2019/10/18/choosing-your-own-adventure	30	I	doubt	Doggett	or	Egan	would	disagree	with	most	of	the	points	I	make	about	belief	and	emotion.	Rather,	I	suspect	they	just	didn’t	think	of	deploying	the	distinction	I	make	in	a	way	that	is	relevant	to	explaining	emotional	responses	to	fiction.	So	I	take	myself	to	be	correcting	an	oversight	(which	is	also	common	in	the	literature),	rather	than	saying	something	with	which	they	would	disagree.	
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But	beliefs	about	the	story	are	not	the	only	cognitive	state	that	matters	to	emotional	response,	and	Doggett	and	Egan	were	right,	after	all,	to	point	to	imagining.		So,	second,	here’s	an	argument	to	show	that	imaginings	matter	too	(even	where	there	are	not	beliefs	with	corresponding	contents).	There	is	much	reason	to	believe	that	mental	imagery	is	crucial	to	the	generation	of	emotional	responses	to	fiction,	as	Timothy	Schroeder	and	Carl	Matheson	(2006)	argue	and	as	I	argue	(2011,	2016)	on	the	basis	of	considerations	about	neural	and	cognitive	architecture.	Furthermore,	the	psychologist	and	neuroscientist	Adam	Zeman	(email	communication),	who	is	widely	known	for	his	research	on	aphantasia	(inability	to	have	mental	imagery),	has	found	that	some	people	who	develop	this	condition	lose	their	interest	in	novels,	while	still	maintaining	their	interest	in	movies.	The	most	plausible	explanation	for	that	fact	is	that	mental	imagery	(in	absence	of	imagistic	perceptual	inputs)	is	important	to	the	emotional	engagement	that	fictional	works	generate.	But	for	reasons	given	in	Section	1,	much	of	the	content	of	this	imagery	won’t	be	believed	as	being	true	in	the	official	story	(such	as	the	exact	imagined	shape	of	Little	Nell’s	face,	postures,	etc.).	So	the	generation	of	emotional	responses	to	fiction	is	heavily	influenced	by	the	rich,	detailed	imagined	internal	representations	that	the	generating	representations	of	the	story	prompt,	over	and	above	beliefs	about	the	basic	elements	of	the	story.	A	related	(bonus)	argument	is	that	the	phenomenology	of	caring	about	fictional	characters	involves	seeming	to	care	about	them	directly—personally—and	not	indirectly	via	what	the	story	says	about	them.	So	it	seems	that	some	of	our	emotionally	charged	representations	of	fictional	entities	and	event	must	lack	the	in-the-story	operator,	since	the	presence	of	the	operator	in	the	representing	structure	would	thwart	the	directness	of	the	caring.	But	then—since	people	are	not	confusedly	thinking	the	story	characters	and	events	are	real—the	
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cognitive	attitude	portraying	the	characters	and	events	that	are	directly	(operator	free)	cared	about	must	be	imagining	(not	belief).31		Third,	there	is	an	argument	to	be	made	that	imaginings	and	beliefs	work	together	in	the	generation	of	emotional	responses	to	fiction.	More	precisely,	which	beliefs	one	has	about	a	given	story	while	consuming	the	fictional	work	in	which	it’s	presented	make	a	difference	to	whether	and	how	the	imaginings	one	has	impact	one	emotionally.	To	see	this,	ask	yourself:	why	do	people	hate	spoilers?	A	spoiler,	of	course,	is	something	you	encounter	that	presents	information	about	crucial	story	events	before	you	go	through	the	official	generating	representations	of	the	story	in	the	intended	order.	And	what	gets	spoiled	are	the	emotional	responses,	like	excitement	and	suspense,	that	you	would	have	had	in	absence	of	the	spoiler.	But	how	do	spoilers	work?	Here’s	what	I	take	to	be	the	most	plausible	explanation.	A	spoiler	gives	you	beliefs	about	crucial	story	events	before	you’re	ready.	More	precisely,	when	you	encounter	a	spoiler,	you	form	beliefs	about	crucial	story	events	without	having	been	led	by	the	generating	representations	of	the	fiction	through	all	the	details	that	lead	up	those	events.	That	is,	you	form	Ba	<s-i>p	states	about	the	main	events	of	the	story	without	having	had	the	generating	representations	of	the	story	spark	your	more	detailed	(often	imagistic)	imaginings	of	the	relevant	characters,	places,	and	events	that	led	up	to	those	main	events.		And	your	imaginings	of	those	details	do	not	generate	the	same	emotions	as	they	otherwise	would	have,	had	you	had	a	different	profile	of	beliefs	about	the	story	as	you	consumed	it.	If,	for	example,	you	are	caused	by	a	spoiler	to	believe	that	a	certain	outcome	is	bound	to	happen	in	a	story,	imagining	(including	with	mental	imagery)	the	events	in	detail	that	lead	up	to	that	event	won’t	be	nearly	as	suspenseful,	exciting,	joyous,	fearful,	etc.	as	they	otherwise	would	be.	And	that’s	why	we	hate	spoilers.	By	giving	us	pivotal	beliefs	before	we’re	ready	(we	already	know	how	it	turns																																																									31	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	suggesting	this	bonus	argument.	
		 30	
out),	spoilers	deprive	our	imaginings	of	their	characteristic	emotional	power.	Thus,	the	hatred	of	spoilers—assuming	we’re	right	to	hate	them—shows	that	imaginings	matter	
along	with	the	relevant	beliefs	to	the	emotional	engagement	of	a	story	and	that	the	sequencing	of	the	mental	states	in	relation	to	one	another	matters	too.	The	pivotal	beliefs	about	what	“actually”	happens	have	to	hit	at	the	right	time,	once	the	imaginings,	other	intermediary	beliefs,	and	other	mental	states	have	all	been	sequenced;	that	is	when	you	get	the	emotional	electricity.	There	is—from	a	research	standpoint—much	more	work	to	be	done	in	spelling	out	the	dynamics	of	how	the	relevant	beliefs	and	imaginings	do	or	don’t	interact,	but	that	there	are	important	and	interesting	interactions	should	by	now	be	clear.32	These	arguments,	if	they’re	right,	establish	the	Emotions	thesis.	To	be	exact,	if	the	first	two	are	right,	they	are	sufficient	to	establish	it	even	without	the	third.	And	if	the	third	argument	is	right,	that	establishes	the	thesis	on	its	own.	If	all	three	are	compelling,	so	much	the	better.		Now—to	step	back	and	see	the	big	picture—the	serious	(belief)	side	of	fictional	cognition	and	the	playful	(imagining)	side	both	matter	to	our	emotional	responses.	But	they	matter	in	different	ways.	The	serious	side	is	the	constraint:	did	that	really	just	happen?	did	she	really	die?	We	want	to	know	these	things,	and	we	thus	bother	to	form	and	even	argue	about	beliefs	about	the	story	that	are	constrained	by	its	generating	representations.	But	with	our	imaginings—the	playful	side—we	make	the	story	our	own	and	give	it	rich	imagery	and	non-imagistic	details	beyond	what	bare	beliefs	would	support.	And	those	personalized	
																																																								32	We	can	also	come	at	this	from	a	different	angle.	Suppose	you	happen	to	guess	the	outcome	of	a	story	in	advance	of	getting	there.	Going	through	the	story	in	this	case	will	still	be	more	suspenseful	than	if	you	had	had	a	spoiler	that	just	tells	you	the	outcome.	And	the	reason	for	this	is	that	spoiler-induced	beliefs	about	what	will	happen	kill	suspense,	fear,	excitement,	etc.	much	more	than	guesses	do.	So	it	is	important	to	view	spoilers	as	inducing	beliefs.	So	insofar	as	spoilers	make	an	emotional	difference	to	the	story	experience,	they	do	so	by	way	of	beliefs	about	the	story.	So	a	belief	that	in-the-story	p	can	make	a	difference	to	emotional	experience	of	a	story	that	imagining	that	p	or	guessing	that	in-the-story	p	just	wouldn’t	make;	the	latter	two	states	aren’t	spoiling	(or	aren’t	so	to	nearly	the	same	extent).		
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details	matter.	I	doubt	any	two	readers	of	The	Old	Curiosity	Shop	imagine	Little	Nell	in	
exactly	the	same	way.	So	imagining	makes	us	co-creators	of	the	version	of	the	story	in	our	heads	whose	exact	details	belong	to	each	of	us	alone.	So	it	is	not	just	any	Little	Nell	who	dies.	It	is	my	Little	Nell.	Or	so	it	is	experienced	by	the	weeping	readers.			
Conclusion:	A	Solution	to	the	Shared-Personal	Puzzle		Let’s	review	the	arc	of	this	essay.	My	frequently	invoked	example	was	how	I	represented	the	criminal	Magwitch	as	I	read	the	novel	Great	Expectations.	I	noted	that	I	had	an	imagining	that	he	had	a	De	Niro-looking	face,	even	though	I	didn’t	believe	that	this	was	true	in	the	novel	story.	That	observation	supported	the	thesis	that,	in	story	cognition,	Ia	p	can	occur	without	Ba	<s-i>p,	which	gave	us	the	Separability	thesis.	Separability,	in	turn,	was	explained	by	the	Conceptual	Differences	that	obtain	for	the	two	mental	state	types	(Architecture,	Iteration,	Epistemic	Correctness,	Selection,	and	Inference	Rules).	Those	Conceptual	Differences—especially	Epistemic	Correctness	and	Selection—also	revealed	that	the	two	mental	states	have	different	profiles	in	terms	of	the	phenomena	they	explain.	Ba	<s-i>p	explained	more	serious	side	phenomena,	like	arguing	over	which	interpretation	of	a	story	is	correct.	Ia	p	explained	the	more	playful	side	phenomena,	like	daydreaming	about	story	entities,	fan	fiction,	and	acting	out	story	scenes	with	props.		Most	importantly,	the	arguments	and	theses	here	constitute	independent	support	for	an	overall	theoretical	picture	that,	as	should	be	clear	by	now,	solves	the	shared-personal	puzzle	with	which	this	essay	began.	It	is	our	capacity	to	have	beliefs	about	stories	that	enables	us	to	share	them,	and	we	evidently	do	care	about	sharing	them.	Otherwise,	why	would	we	argue	about	what	happens	in	a	fiction?	But	at	the	same	time,	each	of	us	dresses	up	that	skeleton	of	beliefs	about	the	stories	with	vivid	and	rich	imaginings	that	are	entirely	
one’s	own.	And	the	fact	that	these	vivid	and	rich	representations	are	imaginings	and	not	beliefs	means	that	no	one	in	the	entire	world	can	tell	me	I’m	wrong	about	them.	We	
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audience	members	may	share	the	skeleton	of	belief—and	enjoy	the	fact	that	we	do—but	clothing	it	beautifully	in	the	imagination	as	I	myself	do	is	something	that	belongs	to	me	personally.	And	you,	of	course,	can	say	the	same.	This	combination	of	shared	and	personal,	I	think,	is	the	deeper	phenomenon	that	this	essay	illuminates	about	story	cognition.	A	good	story	has	the	peculiar	joy	of	being	both	
ours	and	mine.	This,	however,	is	only	possible	in	light	of	our	psychological	make	up,	which	includes	the	cognitive	flexibility	to	bring	more	than	one	attitude	to	bear	on	the	stories	that	enchant	us.			
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Appendix:	Three	Open	Research	Questions	for	Philosophers	of	Imagination	One	additional	virtue	a	theoretical	perspective	can	have	is	that	it	opens	up	further	interesting	questions	for	inquiry,	beyond	those	that	had	to	be	addressed	in	arguing	for	it.	A	solid	theory	gives	resources	not	just	for	answering	some	questions	but	also	for	asking	others	more	clearly	or	even	at	all.	So	as	further	advertisement	for	the	theoretical	views	in	this	paper,	I	offer	here	three	questions	that	they	open	up.	First,	does	imaginative	resistance,	whatever	that	turns	out	to	be,	concern	resistance	to	having	(or	inability	to	have)	certain	Ia	p	states,	Ba	<s-i>p	states,	or	both?	The	literature	on	imaginative	resistance	generally	talks	in	terms	of	what	people	can’t	or	won’t	“imagine”	and,	for	the	most	part,	doesn’t	distinctly	ask	what	might	be	going	on	with	beliefs	about	the	stories	that	induce	resistance.	And	Gendler,	as	we	saw,	uses	“make-believing”	in	a	way	that	conflates	things.	But	it	is	at	least	a	reasonable	hypothesis	that	the	resistance-inducing	stories	affect	beliefs	about	stories	and	imaginings	differently.	It	is	an	open	question	whether	this	hypothesis	is	true.		Now	to	be	fair,	some	parties	in	the	literature,	e.g.,	Kengo	Miyazono	and	Shen-yi	Liao	(2016),	do	draw	the	relevant	distinction	between	resistance	on	the	part	of	imagining	and	resistance	on	the	part	of	belief.	Characterizing	the	“Fictionality	puzzle”	they	write:	“Why	does	the	reader	have	difficulty	accepting	that	it	is	fictional,	or	true	in	the	story	world,	that	Giselda	[who	in	the	story	killed	her	baby	because	it	was	a	girl]	did	the	right	thing?”	I	take	it	that	by	“accepting”	they	mean	something	close	to	believing,	and	they	differentiate	this	puzzle	from	the	“Imaginative	puzzle,”	which	is	about	why	one	has	difficulty	imagining	such	things.	But	it	is	fair	to	say	that	it	is	not	common	in	the	literature	to	draw	the	relevant	psychological	distinctions	so	clearly,	and	the	few	authors	that	do	have	not	fully	answered	the	question.	So	it	is	open.	Note	also	that	their	Fictionality	puzzle,	as	Miyazono	and	Liao	describe	it,	is	different	from	Weatherson’s	(2004)	“alethic	puzzle,”	which	he	describes	like	
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this:	“The	first	puzzle,	the	alethic	puzzle,	is	why	authorial	authority	breaks	down	in	cases	like	Death	on	the	Freeway.	Why	can’t	the	author	just	make	sentences	like	the	last	sentence	in	
Death	true	in	the	story	by	saying	they	are	true?”	(Weatherson’s	bold	text).	This	is	a	puzzle	about	metaphysical	limits	on	what	authors	can	make	fictionally	true,	whereas	as	the	Fictionality	puzzle	is	a	puzzle	about	the	psychological	limits	on	what	story	consumers	can	believe/accept—one	puzzle	is	metaphysical	and	the	other	psychological.	Perhaps	the	alethic	puzzle	and	the	Fictionality	puzzle	at	the	end	of	the	day	stand	and	fall	together.	But	we	cannot	just	assume	this,	so	I	hope	the	work	of	this	essay	makes	it	possible	to	address	the	Fictionality	puzzle	with	greater	clarity.		Second,	do	we	get	Separability	in	the	other	direction?	We	saw	that	it	is	perfectly	normal,	for	a	given	p,	for	one	to	have	Ia	p	while	consuming	a	story	without	also	having	Ba	<s-
i>p.	But	is	it	also	normal	or	even	possible,	for	a	given	p,	for	one	while	consuming	a	story	to	have	Ba	<s-i>p	without	Ia	p?	That	is,	can	one	believe	that	something	is	true	in	a	story	without	also	imagining	it?	Potential	examples	include	cognition	of	stories,	like	in	the	poem	“Jabberwocky,”	in	which	many	of	the	words,	like	“brillig,”	are	remembered	but	not	understood.	So	perhaps	we	can	believe	that	in-the-story	it	was	brillig	without	imagining	this.	But—to	put	it	mildly—many	other	issues	must	be	sorted	out	before	such	a	conclusion	can	be	reached.	So	this	is	another	open	question.	Third,	a	question	comes	up	that	has	been	labeled	in	one	circle	(people	who	read	earlier	drafts	of	this	essay)	“the	dishwasher	problem.”	When	I	wash	the	dishes,	I	imagine	many	things	(places,	conversations,	etc.).	And	these	imaginings	have	nothing	to	do	with	my	dishwashing.	So	when	I	cognize	a	story	and	form	beliefs	about	what	happens	in	it,	why	is	it	the	case	that	various	imaginings	I	have	as	I’m	doing	this	count	as	being	at	all	linked	to	the	story?	Why	isn’t	it	the	case	that	my	imaginings,	especially	the	unprescribed-yet-appropriate	ones,	are	as	irrelevant	to	the	story	cognition	as	my	imaginings	during	dishwashing	are	to	
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the	dishwashing?	What	is	it	that	binds	my	imaginings	to	the	story?	Having	done	some	preliminary	work	on	this	issue,	I	can	say	it	is	not	as	easy	as	it	at	first	seems	(and	note	also	the	echo	here	of	Wittgenstein’s	example	of	imagining	King’s	College	on	fire:	how	do	you	know	it’s	King’s	College	you’re	imagining?).	So	this	is	another	open	question.		The	dishwasher	problem	also	arises	in	the	background	of	the	daydreaming,	fan	fiction,	and	play	acting	explananda	discussed	earlier.	Presumably,	when	one	takes	enough	liberties,	what	one	is	daydreaming,	writing	fan	fiction	about,	or	play	acting	is	altogether	a	different	story	from	the	one	that	initiated	the	fantasy.	So	there	is	a	psychological	question	here	and	a	metaphysical	question.	The	psychological	one	is:	what	psychological	structures	bind	my	imaginings	(in	imaginative	elaborations	of	a	story)	to	beliefs	about	the	initial	story?	The	metaphysical	one	is:	what	makes	distinct	representations	all	representations	of	the	
same	story?	The	dishwasher	problem	is	the	psychological	question;	if	it	can	be	answered,	that	might	go	some	way	to	answering	the	metaphysical	question	as	well.		
	
